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Preventing the Manipulation of
Commodity Futures Markets: To
Deliver or Not to Deliver?
By M. VAN SMIrH*
Manipulation of commodity markets threatens the ability of
persons in a society to barter for the necessities of life. For society
to endure, therefore, the law must prevent manipulation.1 A Ro-
man official warned grain merchants who were witholding grain
from a market:
Apollonius to the grain merchants of Aspendus: the earth is
the mother of us all, for she is just, but you in your injustice have
acted as though she were your mother exclusively. If you do not
stop, I will not let you exist upon her.'
To prevent powerful traders or speculators from manipulating
commodity futures markets,3 exchanges are regulated by the Coin-
LL.B., University of Colorado, 1959.
1. See generally 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 15, 312 (1959).
2. P. MACKENDRICK, THE RoMAN MIND AT WORK 105 (1958).
3. A commodity futures contract is a contract between a buyer and a seller in which
the seller promises to deliver a particular commodity at an established future date. For a
brief description of the process of commodity futures trading, see Smith, Breaking the
Chains that Bind: Arbitration Agreement Versus Forum Rights Under the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 16 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 749, 750 n.4 (1979). See gen-
erally S. ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODrns (1972); H. BAKKEN, FUTURES
TRADING IN LIVEsTOCK (1970); G. GOLD, MODERN COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING (1959); B.
GOULD, Dow JoNEs-IRwN GUIDE TO COMMODITIEs TRADING (1973); T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOM-
ICS or FUTURES TRADING (1971); C. KELTNm, How To MAKE MONEY IN COMMODITIES (1960);
S. KROLL & L SHISKO, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE (1973); R. TEwELES, C.
HAR.Low & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTUREs GAM (1974).
The interests in the contract are bought and sold on a commodity futures market, the
"exchange," with standardized terms as to quality, quantity, and delivery specified by the
exchange's rules and regulations. Standardization secures performance by making perform-
ance independent of the investor's finances. Because of standardization, commodity futures
contracts are readily fungible. Jones & Cook, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act of 1974, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. Rav. 457, 460 (1975). Price is the only negotiable term and
must be negotiated by floor brokers who represent the trader on the floor of the exchange in
an open bidding procedure. 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
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modity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission). Fed-
eral regulation of commodity futures exchanges began in 1922 with
the Grain Futures Act,4 which was amended in 1936 to increase the
penalties and renamed the Commodity Exchange Act.5 The Act re-
mains the basis for government regulation of commodity futures
markets today.6
The purpose of the Act is to prevent manipulation. Section
9(b) of the Act7 makes it a felony "for any person to manipulate or
attempt to manipulate," or to "corner or attempt to corner"' the
price of any commodity for future delivery. Despite this express
prohibition, manipulation remains a major problem.
The thesis of this Article is that government is incapable of
preventing the manipulation of commodity futures markets be-
cause of the debilitating influence of law requiring that commodity
futures contracts be performable by delivery. The Article first
traces the historical development of the law requiring delivery.
The Article then examines the flaws in the current market and the
A trader who acquires an interest in buying a particular commodity is said to hold a
"long" position; conversely, a seller is referred to as holding a "short" position. Traders in
commodity futures do not buy the commodity per se; rather, they buy incorporeal contract
rights or interests.
Because the futures contract is performed at a future date, it is possible for traders to
intervene actively to change conditions, or merely to take advantage of natural changes in
circumstances, between the date on which an interest is acquired and the delivery date.
While it is from these fluctuations in conditions that a trader legitimately expects to make a
profit, too aggressive a role in creating the changed circumstances creates an unfair advan-
tage. This, very simply, is the problem of manipulation.
4. 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. m 1979)).
5. 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. m1 1979)).
6. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1922, § 3 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976));
H.R. REP. No. 421, 74th Cong., lst Sess. 1-3 (1935); 80 CONG. Ruc. 6161, 6164 (1936) (re-
marks of Senator Pope); 62 CONG. Rec. 9406, 9414 (1922).
7. Commodity Exchange Act of 1922, § 9(b), 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (Supp. II 1979).
8. A "corner" generally refers to a situation in which the holder of a long position also
has acquired a substantial portion of the deliverable commodity so as to obtain a dominant
position in the cash market or spot market. See Comment, The Delivery Requirement: An
Illusory Bar to Regulation of Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171,
175 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Delivery Requirement]. See also Campbell, Trading in Fu-
tures Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 237 n.41 (1958). A
"squeeze" generally refers to the situation in which the trader has acquired a dominant
position only in the futures market. A squeeze can result from a small corner or from a
natural scarcity of a commodity. See J. BAER & 0. SAXON, COMMODITY EXCHANGES AND FU-
TuREs TRADING 83 (1949) [hereinafter cited as COMMODIrrY EXCHANGES]. The effect of a cor-
ner or a squeeze is to give the trader substantial control over the price of the future as the
delivery date approaches because the amount of deliverable commodity available is insuffi-
cient to fulfill the trader's futures contract.
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regulatory framework, which make manipulation p.ossible. Finally,
the Article evaluates various proposals for alleviating the problem.
Development of the Delivery Requirement-The
Competing Interests
The state's interest in preventing manipulation has provided
an impetus for laws for as long as there have been commodity mar-
kets. In the fourth century B.C., Athens regulated its markets to
ensure an adequate food supply.9 In 483 A.D., Roman Emperor
Zeno issued a decree to the Praetorian Prefect of Constantinople
forbidding the manipulation of commodity markets.10 The Muslim
Code also forbade the buying of commodities intended for markets
upon the roads outside of towns.1 English laws against manipula-
tion date from the 13th century." In 1550, Parliament passed the
statute of Edward VI, the principal statute against regrators, fore-
stallers, and engrossers. ' s With the development of trade on the
British Isles, however, the medieval statutory restrictions on free
trade fell into disuse. Speaking of the statute of Edward VI, Adam
Smith wrote in 1776:
Our ancestors seem to have imagined that the people would
buy their corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant,
9. J.M. MEHL, THE FUTURES MARKETS, Marketing, 1954 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE
324.
10. A. EDDY, THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS 2 (1901). Romans suspected of cornering mar-
kets were stoned and their villas were burned. See P. MACKENDRICK, THE RoMAN MIND AT
WORK 21 (1958).
11. See W. BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAW OF MERCHANT 91 (1923).
12. See A Statute of the Pillory and Tumbirel, and of the Assize of Bread and Ale, 51
Hen.3, § 3 (1266). This statute fixed the prices of various commodities and directed local
criminal courts to inquire into forestallers, defining them as persons "that buy anything
afore the due... hour ... or that pass out of the Town to meet such things as come to the
Markets. . . to the intent they may sell the same in the Town more dear unto Regrators."
See also Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE L.J.
905, 907-908, 914 (1926).
13. An Act Against Regrators, Forestallers and Engrossers, 5 & 6 Edw.6, c.14, §§ 1-3
(1552). Engrossing was the practice of cornering supply by large purchases of a commodity.
Forestalling consisted of intercepting suppliers on the way to a market and buying up com-
modities. Regrating was the creating of an artificial scarcity by buying up goods in the mar-
ket and reselling them in or near the same market. See also 3 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S
CnmsiNAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1193 (1957); Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 47
YALE L.J. 34, 38-39 (1937). The spirit of these ancient laws is embodied in provisions of the
Commodity Exchange Act that authorize the government to prescribe limits on the number
of commodity futures contracts that can be held for speculation. See Commodity Exchange
Act of 1922, § 4a, 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1976).
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who, they were afraid, would require, over and above the price
which he paia to the farmer, an exorbitant profit to himself. They
endeavored, therefore, to annihilate his trade altogether .... The
statute of Ed. VI, therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible
any middle man from coming between the grower and the con-
sumer, endeavored to annihilate a trade, of which the free exer-
cise is not only the best palliative of the inconveniences of a
dearth, but the best preventative of that calamity; after the trade
of the farmer no trade contributing so much to the growing of the
corn as that of the corn merchant.
14
The repeal of the Act of Edward VI by the Act of George fIf1i
set the stage for a confrontation between the state's interest in
preventing the manipulation of commodity markets and the
merchants' interest in trading commodities as they pleased. In Rex
v. Rusby,le the defendant was accused of the common law crime of
regrating. The court found the defendant guilty, holding that re-
grating as a common law crime had not been repealed by the Act
of George III. In his opinion, Lord Kenyon replied to Adam
Smith's attack on the crime of regrating:
I wish Dr. Adam Smith had lived to hear the evidence of to-
day, and then he would have seen whether such an offense exists,
and whether it is to be dreaded. If he had been told that cattle
and corn were brought to market, and then bought by a man
whose purse happened to be longer than his neighbor's, so that
the poor man who walks the street and earns his daily bread by
his daily labor could get none but through his hands, and at the
price he chose to demand; that it had been raised 3d., 6d., 9d., is.,
2s., and more a quarter on the same day,-would he have said
there was no danger from such an offense?17
14. 2 A. SMITH, AN INQUmy INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,
bk. IV, ch. IV (1776).
15. An Act for Repealing Several Laws, 12 Geo.3, c.71, § 1 (1772).
16. 170 Eng. Rep. 241 (1800).
17. Id. at 242. Lord Kenyon charged the jury- "This cause presents itself to [your]
notice on behalf of all ranks, rich and poor, but more especially the latter .... The law has
not been disputed; for though in evil hour all the statutes which had been existing above a
century were at one blow repealed, yet, thank God, the provisions of the common law were
not destroyed. The common law, though not to be found in the written records of the realm,
has long been well known. It is contemporary with civilized society itself, and was formed
from time to time by the wisdom of man .... Even amongst the laws of the Saxons are to
be found many wise provisions against forestalling and offenses of this kind, and those laws
laid the foundation of our common law. That it remains an offense, nobody has controverted
.... It has been said that in one county, I will not name it, a rich man has placed his
emissaries to buy all the butter coming to the market- if such a fact does exist, and the poor
of that neighborhood cannot get the necessaries of life, the event of your verdict may be
[Vol. 32
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Reacting to judicial decision holding that regrating, forestall-
ing, and engrossing were common law crimes that had not been
repealed by the Act of George III, Parliament abrogated those
crimes by a general Act on July. 4, 1844.18 Parliament expressly
provided, however, that the Act did not apply to the offenses of
spreading false rumors to affect prices, or of preventing goods from
being brought to market by force or threats.19
The Rule Against Wagers
Parliament's repeal of the common law crime of forestalling
favored the merchants' interest in making profits. No longer illegal
per se, manipulation was illegal only if accomplished through a
conspiracy, by force, or by spreading false rumors.20 This solution
was, however, unsatisfactory. One person could legally manipulate
a market so long as false rumors or force were not used. As a con-
sequence, the law has been straining back towards Lord Kenyon's
view that manipulation should be illegal per se.
The movement back towards Lord Kenyon's view came with
alacrity as courts began to embrace the rule against wagers as a
means of attacking the evil of manipulation. A wager is a bet or a
contract by which two or more parties agree that a sum of money
or other consideration shall be delivered to one of them on the oc-
currence or nonoccurrence of an uncertain event.21 In the early
common law, wagers were not void per se, but a particular wager
was illegal if repugnant to morality or public policy.2 2 In England,
the Statute of Victoria in 1845 made all wagers nonenforceable.23
highly useful to the public." Id. at 242. See also King v. Wadington, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (1800)
(engrossing remained a common law crime even after the Act of George Ill). • .
18. An Act for Abolishing the Offences of Forestalling, Regrating, and Engrossing, 7 &
8 Vict., c.24 (1848). The Act nullified in whole or in part eighteen English statutes, ten
Scottish statutes, and eight Irish statutes that restricted trade. Additionally, the Act's pre-
amble made it clear that Parliament intended to overrule expressly those cases, such as Rex
v. Rusby, that held that these common law crimes had been unaffected by the Act of George
HII.
19. Id. § 4.
20. See 1 A. EDDY, LAw OF COMBINATIONS 62 (1901); Mason, Monopoly in Law and
Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34, 38-39 (1937).
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1416 (5th ed. 1979).
22. See J. Dos PAssos, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS & STOCK ExCHANGES
406-407 (1968).
23. An Act to Amend the Law Concerning Games and Wages, 8 & 9 Vict., c.109 (1845).
Section 18 of the Act provided: "[A]l1 Contracts or Agreements, whether by Parole or in
July 1981]
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The first case decided under the Statute of Victoria,
Grizewood v. Blane,24 involved an agreement to sell to a stockbro-
ker stock that the seller did not own at the time of contract, with
the stock to be delivered at a future date. When the market price
for the stock rose and the seller could not deliver at the price
agreed upon, he promised to pay the difference between the sales
price and the market price on the day set for delivery. The seller
failed to perform his promise, and the broker brought an action for
damages. As a defense, the seller pleaded that, under the Statute
of Victoria, the contract was an illegal wager on the price of the
shares. The case was submitted to a jury on the issue of whether
the parties actually intended to sell the stock in question at the
time the contract was made. The jury was instructed that, if the
parties did not intend the actual delivery of the shares, the con-
tract was a gambling transaction and therefore void. The jury
found for the seller, and the verdict was sustained on appeal2 5
Grizewood established the rule that the defense of an illegal
wager raises a question of fact of whether the parties intended de-
livery. This rule was immediately accepted in the United States.
26
In Weld v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co.,2 7 the New York court
stated:
The generally accepted rule on this subject can be very sim-
ply stated. A man may lawfully sell goods or stock for future de-
livery, even though he has none in his possession, if he really in-
tends and agrees to deliver them at the appointed time. Such a
transaction constitutes a valid contract, which is enforceable in
the courts. But a man may not, under the guise of such a con-
tract, enter into a naked speculation upon the rise or fall of
prices, in which there is to be no delivery of property, and no
payment except such as may be necessary to provide for differ-
ences arising purely from market fluctuations. Such a transaction
is a mere wager, which is condemned alike by statute and public
Writing, by way of gaming or wagering, shall be null and void; and that no Suit shall be
brought or maintained in any Court of Law or Equity for recovering any Sum of Money or
valuable Thing alleged to be won upon any Wager, or which shall have been deposited in
the Hands of any Person to abide the event on which any Wager shall be made." Id. § 18.
24. 138 Eng. Rep. 578 (1852).
25. Id. at 583.
26. See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499 (1884); Taylor, Trading in Commodity Fu-
tures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63, 67 (1933). See also J. Dos PASsos,
TREAT sE ON THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS & STOCK EXCHANGES 408 (1968).




The courts embraced the intent-to-deliver rule as a means of
attacking the evil of manipulation. This use of the intent-to-deliver
rule conformed with the popular belief that gambling and manipu-
lation were interrelated evils.29 As one court stated, gambling
caused
[m]en of small means to enter into transactions far beyond
their capital, which they do not intend to fulfill, and thus the ap-
parent business in the particular trade is inflated and unreal, and
like a bubble needs only to be pricked to disappear; often carry-
ing down the bona fide dealer in its collapse. Worse even than
this, it tempts men of large capital to make bargains of stupen-
dous proportions, and then to manipulate the market to produce
the desired price .... 30
The rule requiring an intent to deliver introduced an element
into the law of commodity futures trading that would later limit
the courts' ability to clarify the law. Only a minuscule percentage
of commodity futures contracts were performed by delivery.31 To
classify commodity futures contracts by the rule requiring an in-
tent to deliver would be to classify commodity futures contracts as
illegal gambling contracts. As a consequence, commodity futures
contracts were widely condemned by statute and case law.
3 2
The Grain Futures Act of 1922 ss logically should have pre-
empted the state law that classified commodity futures contracts
as illegal gambling transactions. 4 Despite the logic of preemption,
28. Id. at 103, 92 N.E. at 420.
29. Typical of this belief was the statement of Senator Capper of Kansas in 1926 when
he introduced a bill to ban shorting (selling) on commodity futures markets: "Inasmuch as
selling, and nothing but selling, forces a decline, and inasmuch also as 90 percent of the
selling is done by gamblers selling short to force a decline, it follows that speculative selling
is the dominant factor in forcing a decline in the wheat market." COMMODITY EXCHANGES,
supra note 8, at 79.
30. Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155, 158-59 (1872). See also Lyon & Co. v. Culbert-
son, Blair & Co., 83 Ill. 33, 39-40 (1876); Pickering v. Cease, 79 1Il. 328, 339 (1875); Lurie,
Commodities Exchanges As Self-Regulating Organizations in the Late 19th Century: Some
Perimeters in the History of American Administrative Law, 28 RuTGras L. Rpv. 1107, 1130
(1975).
31. See REPORT OF THE GRAIN FUTuREs ADMINISTRATION 46 (1924); Note, Legislation
Affecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARv. L. REv. 912, 913-14 nn.8-9 (1932).
32. Id.; see Huff v. State, 164 Ark. 211, 261 S.W. 654 (1924); Baltimore Trust Co. v.
Stanton, 144 S.C. 490, 142 S.E. 716 (1928); Palmer v. Love, 18 Tenn. App. 579, 80 S.W.2d
100 (1935).
33. 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. m1 1979)).
34. Taylor, Trading in Commodity Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE
L.J. 63 (1933).
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two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court prevented
state law from being completely preempted.
The intent-to-deliver rule was first addressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain
& Stock Co.,35 in which the Chicago Board of Trade sought to en-
join the illegal use of its market quotations by a "bucket shop.""6
Instead of maintaining that it was not a bucket shop, the defen-
dant accused the Chicago Board of Trade of being "the greatest of
all bucket shops." To appreciate the ingenuity of this defense, it
should be remembered that during the 1890's, several of the major
bucket shops were larger and more affluent than the average New
York Stock Exchange member firm. 37 Indeed, stock and commod-
ity exchanges, no different in outward appearance from the legiti-
mate exchanges, had been organized to facilitate the operation of
bucket shops.3 8 If the only difference between a wager and a legal
transaction were whether the parties to the transaction intended
delivery, there was nothing to distinguish the operation of any
commodity futures exchange from the operation of a bucket shop
or bucket shop exchange. It was inescapable that parties to com-
modity futures contracts generally intended to perform by settling
on price differentials, or offsetting, just as did the bucket shops.
The Supreme Court thus faced an exquisite dilemma: if it
decided that an intent to deliver was unnecessary, it would give a
license to bucket shops; but if it decided that an intent to deliver
was necessary, it would put legitimate commodity futures ex-
changes out of business. The Court neither gave a license to bucket
shops nor put legitimate commodity futures exchanges out of busi-
ness. It resorted to the legal fiction 9 that "a set-off is in legal effect
35. 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
36. A "bucket shop" was an establishment that gave the outward appearance of being
a brokerage firm. Instead of actually executing a customer's order on an exchange, however,
the order was "bucketed," being treated merely as a bet against the customer on the books
of the bucket shop. Customers of bucket shops operated on margin, and the shops would
"loan" them the balance owed on an order at an interest rate of up to twenty-five percent
per annum. The bucket shop thus combined the business of bookmaker and loan shark on
fictitious loans. R. SOBEL, Tim CuRBsToNE BROKERS 69 (1970). See also Smith, The Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and the Return of the Bucketeers: A Lesson in
Regulatory Failure, 57 N.D.L. REv. 7 (1981).
37. R. SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS 71 (1970).
38. Id. at 63.
39. A legal fiction is a false statement made with a consciousness of its falsity. L.
FULLER, LEGAL FiCTIONS 9 (1967). One must assume that the Court never intended that




By employing a legal fiction in Christie, the Supreme Court
carved out a narrow exception for transactions executed on com-
modity futures exchanges from the rule requiring an intent to de-
liver. The Court adhered to the rule by limiting its decision to con-
tracts executed on the floors of exchanges. 41 Thus, the Court
preserved the intent to deliver rule for contracts not made on the
floors of exchanges.
The campaign to put bucket shops out of business was too in-
tense to accept such a facile distinction between the operation of
bucket shops and the custom of offset. If an exception from the
general rule had been made for all offsetting, no reason would have
existed for not extending the same exception to any business of
buying and selling stocks or commodities in which the parties
sought to settle for price differentials rather than actual delivery.
Thus, while it was obvious to the Court that a great financial insti-
tution such as the Chicago Board of Trade was not a bucket shop,
the reason why it was not the "greatest of all bucket shops" did
not seem obvious.
The second case in which the Court preserved the intent to
deliver rule was Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co.42 In Dickson, the
United States District Court in Missouri had found in favor of cus-
tomers challenging the validity of commodity futures contracts on
the ground that the transactions violated the Missouri statute
against gambling.43 The Eighth Circuit reversed and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the
same. The decision thus was not simply an exercise in sophistry as one economist has ac-
cused it of being. See Working, Economic Functions of Futures Markets, in FUTURES TRAD-
ING IN LIVEsTocK 21 (H. Bakken ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Working] (misconstrues the
effect of a legal fiction by stating that the Court found the required intent to deliver despite
the parties' intentions to settle by offset). Nevertheless, the use of legal fiction as the basis
for upholding the operation of worldwide commodity futures markets as a legitimate busi-
ness is, in Professor Fuller's words, "infused with a certain puckishness." L. FULLER, LEGAL
FICTIONS vii (1967).
40. 198 U.S. at 250.
41. Id. This exception was similar to one made in Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. 1, 22
N.E. 49 (1889), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that contracts
executed on a board of trade could be legal so long as the parties did not intend merely to
settle on the differences in prices rather than to deliver.
42. 288 U.S. 188 (1933). Dickson is typical of the cases that hold fixtures trading to be
illegal pursuant to the rule against wagers. In this case, contract invalidity was raised as a
defense by customers who had suffered losses in the market. Taylor, Trading in Commodity
Futures-A New Standard of Legality?, 43 YALE L.J. 63, 79 (1933).
43. 288 U.S. at 192.
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Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the
transactions were illegal under Missouri law." On the question of
preemption of Missouri law by federal law, the Supreme Court
stated:
The Grain Futures Act did not supersede any applicable pro-
visions of the Missouri law making gambling in grain futures ille-
gal ....
The federal act declares that contracts for the future delivery
of grain shall be unlawful unless the prescribed conditions are
complied with .... Nor is there any basis for the contention
that the Congress occupied the field in respect to contracts for
futures delivery; and that necessarily all state legislation in any
way dealing with that subject was superseded. The purpose of the
Grain Futures Act was to control the evils of manipulation of
prices in grain. Such manipulation, Congress found, was effected
through dealings in grain futures.
Many persons had advocated, as a remedy, that all future[s]
trading be abolished. Congress took a less extreme position. It set
up a system of regulation and prohibited all future[s] trading
which did not comply with the regulations prescribed. But it
evinced no intention to authorize all future[s] trading if its regu-
lations were complied with .... The Missouri law is in no way
inconsistent with the provision of the federal act. It does not pur-
port to legalize transactions which the federal law has made ille-
gal. It does not prescribe regulations for exchanges. Obviously,
manipulation of prices will not be made more difficult, because
the state has declared that certain dealings in futures are illegal
and has forbidden the maintenance within its borders of places
where they are carried on.
45
Under Christie and Dickson, the legality of commodity futures
transactions between a customer and a brokerage firm were judged
by a different standard than were transactions on an exchange be-
tween brokers. Owing to the fiction that offset was the same as
delivery, the conflict between the custom of offset and the general
rule against gambling transactions was never completely recon-
cied.46 The rule requiring an intent to deliver cast a pall of illegal-
ity over commodity futures trading.4 7 A disgruntled trader could
44. Id. at 201.
45. Id. at 198-200 (citation omitted).
46. See Lurie, Commodity Exchanges as Self-Regulating Organizations in the Late
19th Century: Some Perimeters in the History of American Administrative Law, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 1107; 1130 (1975).
47. See Irwin, Legal Status of Trading in Futures, 32 ILL. L. REV. 155, 169-70 (1937)
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always cry foul and run to the courthouse for sanctuary.
To avoid the common law rule against wagers, commodity ex-
changes adopted rules requiring all contracts that were not offset
to be performed by delivery.48 It thus became generally accepted
that, to avoid the taint of illegality, commodity futures contracts
had to provide for delivery. This dogma became ingrained in fed-
eral law and was implicit in the Commodity Exchange Act's re-
quirement that delivery be located either at terminal markets
where there was an inspection service or at delivery points ap-
proved by the Secretary of Agriculture.4 9 The delivery requirement
was also implicit in the federal regulators' approval of commodity
futures contracts that required delivery.
Determining Manipulation: The Lack of a Model
Although federal legislation prohibiting manipulation has ex-
isted since 1922,50 manipulation has yet to be defined by statute or
regulation.5 1 Manipulation is commonly understood as causing
others to buy for more or to sell for less than they otherwise would
have. Cases and administrative proceedings have referred to ma-
nipulation as the intentional creation of distorted prices.5 2 This
[hereinafter cited as Legal Status].
48. See Note, Legislation Affecting Commodity and Stock Exchanges, 45 HARV. L.
REv. 912, 913-14 n.14 (1932).
49. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). See Campbell, Trading In Futures Under The Commodity
Exchange Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 215, 229 (1958).
50. The Grain Futures Act was passed in 1922. 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (current version at
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
51. Despite the lack of definition, the Grain Futures Act has been held not to be un-
constitutionally vague. See Bartlett Frazier Co. v. Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 354 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 654 (1933).
52. Arthur R. Marsh, former president of the New York Cotton Exchange, defined
manipulation as "any and every operation or transaction, [or] practice, the purpose of which
is not primarily to facilitate the movement of the commodity at prices freely responsive to
the forces of supply and demand; but, on the contrary, is calculated to produce a price
distortion of any kind in any market either in itself or in its relation to other markets. If a
firm is engaged in manipulation it will be found using devices by which the prices of con-
tracts for some one month in some one market may be higher than they would be if only the
forces of supply and demand were operative; or using devices by means of which the price or
prices of some month or months in a given market may be made lower than they would be if
they were freely responsive to the forces of supply and demand. Any and every operation,
transaction, [or] device, employed to produce these abnormalities of price relationship in
the futures markets, is manipulation." Cotton Prices: Hearings Before A Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 201-03 (1928). See also
Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1962).
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definition is circular, however, for "distortion" is merely a syno-
nym for "manipulation.""3
As an economic problem, manipulation consists of more than
causing a price change. Every trading decision affects the market.
To the extent that any effect on a market causes others to react, all
trading decisions involve some degree of manipulation. Manipula-
tion, then, is not an absolute concept, but rather is the use of ex-
cessive influence. The problem has been to decide at what point
lawful influence becomes unlawful manipulation.
There are two ways to distinguish lawful conduct from manip-
ulation. One way is to let prices gauge when manipulation has oc-
curred. Manipulation occurs when prices are distorted beyond nor-
mal supply and demand. Price distortion is the criterion favored
by economists of Adam Smith's school of thought.5' The economist
sees manipulation as a maladjustment of the relationship between
demand and supply. The other way to determine manipulation is
to focus on intent. Conduct becomes manipulation when a person
acts with the intent to manipulate. Intent is the criterion favored
by Lord Kenyon's school of thought.55 The lawyer sees manipula-
tion as the outward manifestation of an evil intent. Price distortion
is evidence of wrongful conduct rather than the wrongful conduct
itself. By using intent to decide whether a trader has been guilty of
manipulation, one need not show that a trader has caused a change
in prices. Intent to use conduct to force others to act makes one
guilty of manipulation regardless of whether the price is distorted.
These two ways of deciding whether manipulation has oc-
curred are inconsistent. With price distortion as the test, even
though a person acts with an intent to manipulate, a person is not
guilty of manipulation unless the conduct has in fact distorted
prices. With intent as the test, however, one can be guilty of ma-
nipulation without distorting prices.
Although price distortion and intent are inconsistent criteria,
the government has typically attempted to use both in prosecuting
manipulation cases.56 Price distortion has been given the most at-
tention, however, in large part because of the predominant role
played by economists in the federal regulatory structure. The con-
53. See I. CoPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 115 (1953).
54. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
55. See note 17 & accompanying text supra.




centration on price distortion was also a logical result of the rule
that contracts had to be performable by delivery to avoid the taint
of illegality. Inasmuch as the law required a trader to intend deliv-
ery, it is difficult to distinguish the intent to deliver from an illegal
intent to manipulate when a trader insists on delivery.
As a consequence of the CFTC's emphasis on price distortion,
manipulation has become difficult to prosecute. The variables af-
fecting commodity futures prices can be overwhelmingly complex
and are constantly changing.5 Because of the complexity of factors
affecting commodity futures prices, any charge that a trader's con-
duct caused a price distortion must be arbitrary to some degree.58
In an extreme case of control over a market, there need be little
supposition. 9 Generally, however, it is difficult to prove what ef-
fect control has on a market. It is always possible, consequently,
for the defense to assert that a price change occurred because of
factors other than an accused's conduct.
The Cargill Incident: The Difficulty in Proving Manipu-
lation Through Price Distortion
The difficulty in proving manipulation through evidence of
price distortion is well illustrated by the eight-year administrative
proceeding that the United States Department of Agriculture initi-
ated against Cargill, Incorporated in 1964.
Cargill, a large, privately-owned grain company and conglom-
erate,60 was charged with manipulating the May, 1963 wheat fu-
tures market traded on the Chicago Board of Trade and the price
of red winter crop wheat."1 Early in 1963, Cargill believed that
there would be ample supply of old crop soft red winter wheat at
the end of the crop year in May, 1963,2 so it hedged its inventory
57. See R. TEWELES, C. HARLOW & H. STONE, THE COMMODITY FUTURES GAME 147-49
(1974).
58. See Case Comment, Commodities: Futures Control: Manipulation Under the
Commodity Exchange Act, 57 MINN. L. Rav. 1243, 1251-52 (1973).
59. For example, in a case like Peto v. Howell, 101 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1938), in which
the defendant owned 90% of deliverable supply in the United States and 97% of Chicago
deliverable supply, the effect of the manipulator's conduct becomes certain.
60. See generally D. MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN (1978).
61. See In re Cargill, Inc., 29 Agric. Dec. 880 (1970).
62. Soft red winter wheat is grown chiefly in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. In 1963 soft
red winter wheat accounted for approximately fifteen percent of the total United States
wheat crop. It is this wheat that is used by the mills in the Chicago area, with ten to sixteen
million bushels usually accumulated and warehoused in Chicago for sale to the Illinois mills,
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of soft red winter wheat by selling May, 1963 futures on the Chi-
cago Board of Trade.e3 During February, Cargill sold substantial
amounts of cash soft red winter wheat to mills in the southwestern
United States;84 this demand continued into March. 5 Cargill then
changed its opinion of the supply-demand situation, concluded
that old crop wheat would be scarce, and began to close out its
short (sell) hedge of May 1963 futures.8 8
In March, the Spanish Government expressed interest in buy-
ing wheat from Cargill. 7 Cargill continued to close out its short
May, 1963 hedge, and by April 11, 1963, had reduced its short po-
sition to 570,000 bushels.8 On April 15, the next business day,
Cargill bought 820,000 bushels of May 1963 futures, thereby clos-
ing out its short hedge and establishing a long (buy) position of
250,000 bushels.8 9
As of April 12, 1963, there was a total of 2,804,000 bushels of
deliverable grade wheat stored in Chicago warehouses, of which
200,000 bushels were stored in warehouses that were not regular
for delivery.70 Of the total wheat warehoused in Chicago, Cargill
owned 2,471,000 bushels, or about eighty-eight percent.71 Cargill
knew from weekly United States Department of Agriculture re-
to other states, and abroad.
The crop year for wheat in the United States is from June 1 to May 31 of the following
year. The delivery months for Chicago futures are July, September, December, March, and
May. The May 1963 contract was, therefore, the last futures contract for the 1962-1963 crop
(old crop); the July 1963 contract was the first contract for the 1963-1964 crop year. Id. at
888.
63. Hedging acts as a form of insurance for a party buying or selling a particular com-
modity. Thus, the buyer of a commodity that cannot be sold for a period of time can sell a
corresponding amount of futures in that commodity at the same time the commodity is
purchased. When the actual commodity is sold, a corresponding purchase of futures will be
made to offset the original sale of futures. The effect is that any fluctuations in the price of
the commodity will be approximately reflected in the futures. Thus, any losses, or gains, will
be cancelled out, giving the person a measure of security in the market. See Delivery Re-
quirement, supra note 8, at 172.
64. In re Cargill, Inc., 29 Agric. Dec. 880 (1970). The Chicago wheat futures contract is
essentially a soft red winter wheat contract because No. 2 soft red winter wheat is the
cheapest class and grade deliverable at par in satisfaction of the contract. Thus, wheat fu-










ports that it owned most of the deliverable wheat in Chicago,72 and
it continued to add to its long position in May, 1963 futures. 73
Early in May it became known that the Spanish Government
would purchase large quantities of wheat, and, on May 11, it of-
fered to buy 50,000 tons (2,000,000 bushels).7 4 On May 18, the
Spanish Government accepted Cargill's offers to sell 27,500 tons at
prices profitable to Cargill," and Cargill proceeded to load 770,000
bushels of wheat from its Chicago elevator to be shipped to Spain.
This shipment and other commitments left Cargill with approxi-
mately 50,000 bushels of wheat warehoused in Chicago, which was
all the Chicago wheat available for delivery on the May contract.7"
The last day of trading of the May futures contract was May
21.1 At the opening on May 20, Cargill had an open long position
of 1,930,000 bushels.78 May futures had closed the previous trading
day at 2.03 - 2.09 , and opened at 2.11 - 2.14.7 At a meeting
that day, Cargill officials decided to begin liquidation and gave an
order to sell 100,000 bushels at 2.19, but Cargill's floor broker
could sell only 40,000 bushels at that price.3 0
At the opening of trading on May 21, there was an open inter-
est of 8,000,000 bushels, of which Cargill owned approximately
twenty-four percent.81 Trading opened at 2.22 and gradually de-
clined to 2.15 by 11:02 a.m.; during this period Cargill pur-
chased another 100,000 bushels, bringing its long position to
1,990,000 bushels. At 11:45, when the market was trading at 2.20,
Cargill gave its broker price limit orders to sell on a scale up at
prices from 2.27 to 2.28 . The market did not reach the limits
specified until 11:53. From this time until trading closed at around
12:00 p.m., Cargill's broker sold 1,625,000 bushels. Congestion was
such that, at the close of trading, contracts for 420,000 bushels had
72. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1159 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972).
73. . In re Cargill, Inc., 29 Agric. Dec. 880, 889 (1970).




77. In re Cargill, Inc., 29 Agric. Dec. 880, 893 (1970).
78. Id.
79. Id. Prices are quoted at dollars per bushel.
80. Id.
81. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972).
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not been closed out, of which Cargill had contracts for 365,000
bushels."2
After trading had closed on May 21, an official of the Chicago
Board of Trade sought Cargill's cooperation in the orderly liquida-
tion of the open contracts because of the scarcity of soft red wheat
in the Chicago area and suggested that Cargill offer to sell ware-
house receipts to the shorts in order to close out the open con-
tracts.8 " Cargill replied that it only had around 35,000 bushels that
were uncommitted, but that it would make substantially greater
amounts of warehouse receipts available at 2.28 1 if it could be
assured of receiving these receipts back in settlement of its long
position, because the wheat was needed for delivery on prior com-
mitments.8 4 There were no other warehouse receipts available in
Chicago for delivery against the May contract.8 5 After the Board
assured Cargill that it would get its receipts back, Cargill sold
warehouse receipts for 2.28 1 per bushel, which it then recovered
and sold to other persons holding short positions, who in turn used
them to deliver on their short contracts.86
After all the open May contracts were settled, Cargill had
88,000 bushels of old crop wheat in its warehouse. Between June 4
and June 13, Cargill sold this wheat at prices ranging from 2.10 to
2.13 per bushel.
87
The administrative proceeding against Cargill required thirty-
two days and resulted in a 4,715 page record with oral testimony
by some 50 witnesses and over 200 exhibits.8 The hearing exam-
iner wrote a 112-page decision, finding that Cargill had manipu-
lated the market and recommending that Cargill be suspended as a
futures commission merchant for ninety days.89 Except for the
penalty, which was suspended because of the protracted length of
the proceeding, the recommended decision was accepted by a judi-
cial officer in a thirty-five page opinion.90 Cargill filed a petition in
the court of appeals to set aside the finding that it and four of its
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1160-61.
85. Id. at 1161.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. In re Cargill, Inc., 29 Agri. Dec. 880, 882 (1970).
89. Id. at 881-83.
90. Id. at 915.
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officers had manipulated the May, 1963 wheat futures market.,1 In
December, 1971, the court of appeals affirmed the order.9 2
The court of appeals divided the government's case into four
elements: (1) Did Cargill hold a dominant long position in the fu-
ture? (2) Was there an insufficient supply of wheat available from
sources other than Cargill for delivery on the May futures? (3) Did
Cargill exact an artificially high price in settlement of its long fu-
tures contracts? and (4) Was the squeeze intentionally caused by
Cargill?9" The first three elements were relevant to the question
whether Cargill had caused the artificially high price but were im-
material to the question whether Cargill intended to manipulate. If
an intent to manipulate was all that was necessary to make the
conduct wrongful, the effect on the market would only have been
evidence of the intent. The evidence on the question of price dis-
tortion would have been superfluous.9
One problem in establishing price distortion is the difficulty in
comparing futures prices with cash prices. Because cash and fu-
tures prices should converge at the delivery date of a futures con-
tract, a discrepancy between cash and futures prices at delivery
date theoretically shows manipulation. This proof assumes that the
cash market is a true criterion of price. The comparability of cash
and futures prices, however, raises complicated collateral issues.
The court of appeals in Cargill recognized this:
The problem with matching theory to fact lies in the diffi-
culty of determining the cash price of wheat, for actual cash
trades on the Chicago spot market are relatively infrequent and
the prices of individual transactions may vary greatly depending
on the positions of the parties, the quantity involved, and the
time of the transaction. 95
The court observed in a footnote that there had been only one
cash transaction from February 21 until the closing of May futures
on May 21.98 The government relied on cash prices of wheat
91. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
932 (1972).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1164-70.
94. The Act was amended in 1936 to make intent to manipulate sufficient to violate
the statute. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). This was thought to correct the "manifest mistakes" re-
vealed in Wallace v. Cutter, 298 U.S. 229, 237 (1936), that mere attempts to manipulate
were not prohibited. See 80 CONG. REc. 1451 (1936).
95. 452 F.2d at 1168.
96. Id. at 1168 n.12.
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quoted by the Grain Market News, a publication of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.9' In its defense, Cargill relied on reports by
Sosland Trade Publication, which it contended was the more relia-
ble source.98 The small number of cash transactions and the fact
that there were some sales in the 2.27-2.28 range were insufficient
evidence that the 2.27-2.28 price was caused by the alleged manip-
ulation by Cargill. A number of Cargill's witnesses testified that
the futures price was actually not out of line with cash prices and
reflected basic factors of supply and demand.
Recognizing that the evidence as to the "proper" price was
conflicting, the court noted the fact that on May 21, the futures
market traded at 2.20, well below the 2.27-2.28 1/ that Cargill had
demanded during the final fifteen minutes of trading.9 ' The court
concluded, "[ilt seems clear that the only reason the price ad-
vanced so rapidly during the last few minutes of trading was...
Cargill's dominance of the long interest and the high prices it set
for liquidation." 100
The court assumed that 2.28 was a manipulated price because
the market had traded substantially lower earlier during the day.
Given the volatility of commodity futures markets, however, a
large price increase by itself does not establish manipulation.
When there is a small number of market participants, which is
usually the situation on the last few days of trading, prices can
undergo substantial changes with little trading. This thinness of
the market was just as likely the cause of the large price increase
as was any manipulation by Cargill."'
97. Id. at 1168. The cash prices quoted by USDA Grain News were as follows:
May 17 2.15 /2
May 20 2.18 3/
May 21 2.28
May 22 2.15
May 23 2.11 '/s
May 29 2.03
Id. at 1168 n.13.
98. Id. at 1169. The Sosland card showed the cash prices on the relevant dates to be:




May 31 2.03 3/8 bid
Id. at 1168 n.13.
99. Id. at 1169-70.
100. Id. at 1170.
101. See In re Indiana Bureau Coop. Assn., Inc. [1979] CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH)
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The conclusion that Cargill's holding out caused prices to in-
crease was weakened by the lack of evidence on what the other
traders had done and why they had done so. Market prices are as
much the result of what buyers are willing to pay as what sellers
are willing to accept. Because of the lack of evidence on the moti-
vations of the other traders, the court had to assume that the per-
sons holding short positions were forced to do the bidding of Car-
gill. 10 2 There was no evidence, however, that the persons holding
short positions were unable to close out their futures contracts
with other traders.10 3 It is possible that the persons holding short
positions waited until the final fifteen minutes of trading because
they hoped the price would fall below 2.20. Although the court of
appeals may have been correct in assuming that there were no
other traders willing to sell during the final fifteen minutes of trad-
ing, this was only an assumption.
That the court assumed that the persons holding short posi-
tions were forced to pay 2.28 thus reveals that its decision was not
really premised on proof of an artificial price increase. When all is
said and done, the case came down to the fact that Cargill had
held out for delivery when there was no reason to do so other than
to force the persons holding short positions to pay its price.'0" The
court found this fact to be so irresistible that it found Cargill
caused a price distortion despite the lack of evidence of a causal
relationship between Cargill's conduct and the activity of the per-
sons holding short positions.
20,964, at 23,860 ("When a futures market takes toward expiration with declining open
positions it necessarily becomes oligopolistic and oligopsonistic since the actions of any one
participant affect price. The last contract bought and sold is 100 percent of the market.").
102. "The shorts as a practical matter had nowhere else to go except to Cargill and
Cargill knew it." 452 F.2d at 1172.
103. A short position can be closed out (offset) by buying a long position. To be able
to close out, a short has to negotiate a price with a party who is selling.
104. This is also demonstrated by the court's conclusion that Cargill had intentionally
squeezed the market based on Cargill's having exploited its position while most of the other
persons holding long positions did not. The court noted the manipulative nature of such
conduct, stating: "While the obligation to make or take delivery is a bona fide feature of the
futures contract, in reality the futures market is not an alternative spot market for the
commodity itself, and indeed the functions performed by the futures market would proba-
bly be severely hampered if it were turned into an alternative spot market. Most parties
who engage in futures transactions are in no position to either make or take delivery, and if
they were required to always make preparations to fulfill their obligations to make or take
delivery, the number of persons who could effectively participate in the futures market
would be substantially restricted, thus reducing the liquidity and volume of that market."
452 F.2d at 1172-73.
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If the court had decided the case merely on the basis that Car-
gill held out to force prices higher, the question of whether Cargill
actually caused a price distortion was superfluous. Considering the
difficulty of proving a causal relationship between conduct and
price distortion, the government could have presented a much
stronger case by concentrating on Cargill's intent to manipulate,
rather than confusing its case by trying to show a price distortion.
Cargill's petition for certiorari was denied in 1972.105 Thus, the
legal proceedings did not finally end until eight years after Cargill
had been charged. The length of this proceeding alone shows the
futility of attempting to prove manipulation through price
distortion.
The Intent-to-Deliver Rule and Natural Squeezes
An even greater weakness of the price distortion test is its in-
ability to govern the situation in which manipulation has been ac-
complished without control of the deliverable supply. In cases in
which a manipulator has not actively acquired control of the deliv-
erable supply of a commodity, the rule requiring an intent to de-
liver has had an insidious effect.
Inasmuch as parties to commodity futures contracts could law-
fully insist on performance by delivery, manipulation had to be
based, at least ostensibly, on a manipulator's acquiring control
over the cash market and using that control to force others to do
the manipulator's bidding. Because there is nothing inherently un-
lawful in simultaneously having a large position in a cash market
and a large position in its counterpart in the futures market, intent
to manipulate had to be inferred from conduct of debatable legal-
ity. Hence, instead of being able to say that someone had manipu-
lated a market simply by insisting on delivery-generally the only
clear evidence of manipulation-a charge of manipulation required
evidence of aggressive actions by a trader in an attempt to gain
control of cash markets.
Unfortunately for those who would prove a manipulation, it is
common for deliverable supply to be smaller than the amount de-
manded by futures contracts. Such a situation is referred to as a
"natural squeeze." 106 In a natural squeeze market, all that a poten-
105. 406 U.S. 932 (1972).
106. See Cargill,- Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1161 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
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tial manipulator must do to force the persons holding short posi-
tions to pay the demanded price is to insist on the lawful right to
delivery. To demonstrate that a trader holding a substantial long
position intended to manipulate the market by demanding delivery
in the face of a natural squeeze, it became necessary to infer un-
lawful conduct from buying or selling "too much"-conduct that
was, in the abstract, lawful.
If a line could be drawn between lawful conduct and manipu-
lation, it would be a quillet. Because the determining factor is the
degree to which prices can be shown to have caused distortion, ma-
nipulators could squeeze a market until government regulators or-
dered them to stop. Even if the manipulator refused to desist as
ordered, prosecution could be so long and exhausting that govern-
ment officials would be forced to tolerate all but the most blatant
manipulation.
Volkart Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman
The incompatibility of the intent to deliver rule and the policy
of preventing manipulation is exemplified by the case of Volkart
Brothers, Inc. v. Freeman.10 7 The Volkart Brothers firm was a
wholesale dealer in cotton and a member of the New York and
New Orleans Cotton Exchange.108 In October 1955, Volkart held a
substantial long (buy) position in the October cotton futures con-
tracts traded on the New York Cotton Exchange. While other per-
sons with similar positions were closing out their contracts, Volkart
not only kept its position on the New York Cotton Exchange, it
acquired more long cotton futures on the New Orleans Cotton Ex-
change. By October 11, Volkart knew that the supply of cotton de-
liverable against the long contracts it held was less than one-half
the amount needed. Volkart kept its long position through October
by offering to sell only at prices slightly above the market. On the
last day of trading, Volkart raised the price at which it was willing
to sell, forcing those who held short (sell) contracts to pay its price,
which yielded a profit of over $20,000.109
Those parties injured by the manipulation initiated an admin-
istrative proceeding by the Department of Agriculture. The hear-
U.S. 932 (1972).
107. 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
108. Id. at 53.
109. Id. at 58.
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ing officer found Volkart guilty of manipulation and ordered its
trading privileges suspended for fifteen days. 10 The Fifth Circuit
reversed the administrative decision, holding that the weight of ev-
idence did not support a finding of manipulation or attempted ma-
nipulation.1 The court reasoned that Volkart had not manipu-
lated the market because it had merely exploited a squeeze, rather
than having caused it." 2 Faulting Volkart for merely insisting on
delivery, in the view of the court of appeals, would have amounted
to excusing the sellers from the performance of their contracts.
Moreover, the court implied that if delivery could not be insisted
upon, the cotton futures contracts would be illegal wagering
contracts. 113
Volkart exposes the incompatibility of requiring contracts to
be performable by delivery and the policy of preventing manipula-
tion. If manipulation is defined as forcing others to pay too much
or to sell for too little, Volkart manipulated the cotton futures
market because it had no reason for holding its contracts for deliv-
ery other than to force the persons holding short positions to pay
its price. Yet, paradoxically, Volkart's holding for delivery could
not have been a manipulation. Having done no more than take de-
livery, Volkart only did what it had a legal right to do. To have
found Volkart guilty of manipulation would have resulted in the
legal absurdity of finding that the exercise of a lawful right was
unlawful.
The Volkart decision has been criticized as allowing manipula-
tion by squeezes."" The decision, however, was the ineluctable
consequence of the delivery requirement. What was wrong in
Volkart was not the court's reasoning, but its failure to understand
that, despite the formal terms of the contract, it was wrong for the
cotton firm to have insisted on lelivery. The dilemma epitomized
by Volkart is the problem that continues to confound those who
would prevent the manipulation of commodity futures markets.
110. Id. at 53.
111. Id. at 60. The decision has been criticized for not stating why the weight of evi-
dence was insufficient. The court did specifically disagree with the judicial officer's decision
that Volkart had been wrong in holding its contracts for delivery. Id.
112. 311 F.2d at 59.
113. Id. at 60.
114. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 542 F.2d 1154, 1173 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406
U.S. 932 (1972); Delivery Requirement, supra note 8, at 171.
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Federal Regulation: A History of Failure
Conventional thinking holds that the key to preventing ma-
nipulation is to have delivery terms with enough grades and
enough delivery points that deliverable supply cannot be con-
trolled or exploited. 1 5 Such terms could have been implemented
under the Commodity Exchange Act, which required contract mar-
kets (commodity exchanges) to provide for the prevention of ma-
nipulation as a condition of government approval and continued
approval.1 6 The approval power could have been used by federal
officials to instigate delivery terms or exchange procedures that
would allow contracts to be settled by payment in lieu of delivery
under certain circumstances.
Government regulators were unwilling to use this power117
This left them nowhere to go but to a policy of expansion of deliv-
ery terms. Being subverted by the intent-to-deliver rule, govern-
ment efforts to prevent manipulation were reduced to a futility.
This is illustrated by the history of the government efforts to regu-
late the wheat futures contract traded on the Chicago Board of
Trade.
The first administrative proceeding, involving the manipula-
tion of May Chicago wheat in 1959 by two employees of E. F. Hut-
ton, was "successful" only because the employees consented to an
order that they had manipulated March and May wheat futures. 8
The consent decree resulted in an eight-month suspension of trad-
ing privileges.11 9
The next administrative proceeding came in 1964, the eight-
year legal proceeding against Cargill, Incorporated. The lack of ef-
115. See, e.g., Hieronymus, Manipulation In Commodity Futures Trading: Toward a
Definition, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 41, 47-48 (1977). If the solution were as simple as the conven-
tional wisdom supposes it to be, one would think that in the more than 50 years that com-
modity exchanges have been regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act, manipulation
would have been eliminated. For a thorough discussion of the ineffectiveness of merely ex-
panded delivery points and liberalized delivery terms as a means of preventing manipula-
tion, see notes 127-147 & accompanying text infra.
116. 7 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1976).
117. See Small Business Problems Involved in the Marketing of Grains and Other
Commodities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Small Business Problems of the Perma-
nent Select Comm. on Small Business, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1973) (statement of Alex C.
Caldwell); Comment, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822,
834 n.62 (1951).
118. Henry H. Cate, CEA Docket No. 90 (1959).
119. Id.
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fectiveness of this legal proceeding is demonstrated by the fact
that in 1970, during the pendency of the first proceeding, Cargill
was involved in a squeeze of the May, 1970 wheat contract. While
the 1970 squeeze was not publicly reported, it was discussed in an
audit report of the Department of Agriculture.120 The only differ-
ence between the two squeezes was that in 1970, Cargill decided to
stop squeezing the persons holding short positions after being
warned by the Commodity Exchange Authority.
In the next administrative proceeding, Edward Cox and
George Frey, two floor brokers on the Chicago Board of Trade,
were accused of having acted in concert to manipulate the May,
1971 wheat contracts.121 As a result of taking delivery and stopping
delivery notices from May 7 through May 18, the two brokers
owned or controlled seventy-five percent of the 780,000 bushels of
deliverable wheat available in Chicago. By May 19, the floor bro-
kers held contracts calling for delivery of 2,200,000 bushels. The
complaint against them alleged that from 11:31 a.m. on May 19
until 12:00 noon, when the contracts expired, Cox and Frey sold
2,020,000 bushels at $1.70 per bushel, 3 of a cent below the limit
allowed for trading.122 Alex Caldwell, Administrator of the Com-
modity Exchange Act, commented on the complaint, observing
that, although in the past Chicago had an abundant supply of de-
liverable wheat, the city "no longer is a market for cash wheat and
it's fairly easy for manipulators to get control of the limited supply
and use it for their own advantage.112
3
The foregoing survey of federal regulation of Chicago wheat
futures markets over a twenty-year period demonstrates the fu-
tility of the government's efforts to prevent manipulation. As
Chicago waned as a cash market, the futures market became in-
creasingly vulnerable to manipulation. Despite the increasing vul-
nerability of the market to squeezes, however, government regula-
120. See Audit Report No. 6110-1-C, Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture (Sept. 15, 1971). This report was made "for official use only, indefinite reten-
tion," but came to the attention of the public in April, 1973, when it was made available to
the Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee during congressional hearings that preceded
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974. See Schorr, Agriculture Depart-
ment's CEA Audit Fuels Concern Over Adequacy of U.S. Regulation, Wall St. J., Apr. 2,
1973, at 18, col. 2.
121. See In re Cox and Frey, CEA Docket No. 192 (1972).
122. Id.
123. Farm Agency Charges Brokers Manipulated Wheat Futures, Seeks Revised Con-
tracts, Wall St. J., July 12, 1972, at 6, col. 2.
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tors had no authority to prohibit persons from insisting on
delivery. Consequently, traders could squeeze wheat futures with
impunity. Rather than being able to take swift and decisive action
against manipulators, government regulators were reduced merely
to cajoling manipulators to cease squeezing.
Irresolution of the Delivery Problem: The
Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 and
Expanded Delivery Points
In 1974, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act.12 4 The Act was the congressional response to the
public's widespread belief that the grain companies and exchanges
had taken advantage of grain sales to Russia to manipulate the
commodity futures markets.1 25 Although it was never shown that
the tremendous price increases in cash and futures markets were
attributable to anything other than sudden and severe shortages,
the congressional hearings on the proposed legislation revealed the
commodity futures markets' vulnerability to manipulation. The be-
lief that government regulators needed to be able to investigate an
expansion of delivery points found expression in section 208 of the
Act.
126
Section 208 expressly requires each contract market to permit
delivery on, and establish locational price differentials for, futures
contracts traded on contract markets in such a manner "as will
tend to prevent or diminish price manipulation, market congestion,
or the abnormal movement of such commodity in interstate com-
merce.M 27 If a contract market, however, fails to enact rules that
124. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 7 U.S.C.).
125. See generally J. TRAGER, AmBER WAvEs oF GRm (1973).
126. 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(10) (1976).
127. Section 208, 7 U.S.C. § 7(a)(10) (1976), in pertinent part, provides that each con-
tract market shall "permit the delivery of any commodity, on contracts of sale thereof for
future delivery, of such grade or grades, at such point or points and at such quality and
locational price differentials as will tend to prevent or diminish price manipulation, market
congestion, or the abnormal movement of such commodity in interstate commerce. If the
Commission after investigation finds that the rules and regulations adopted by a contract
market permitting delivery of any commodity on contracts of sale thereof for future deliv-
ery, do not accomplish the objectives of this subsection, then the Commission shall notify
the contract market of its finding and afford the contract market an opportunity to make
appropriate changes in such rules and regulations. If the contract market within seventy-five
days of such notification fails to make the changes which in the opinion of the Commission
are necessary to accomplish the objectives of this subsection, then the Commission after
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"accomplish the objectives" of section 208, the Commission, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, may on its own initiative re-
quire the market to enact such rules as the Commission deems
necessary.128 Section 208 thus gives the CFTC authority over the
designation of delivery points and locational price differentials on
commodity futures contracts.
On January 16, 1976, the CFTC published a notice seeking
comment on its attempt to formulate a policy for evaluating con-
tract market delivery points and locational price differentials to
determine compliance with the terms of section 208 and other rel-
evant sections of the Act. 129 The Commission also sought comment
on what policy, if any, should be developed for prescribing addi-
tional delivery points or locational price differentials under section
208. As the delivery point issue is more significant in commodities
with higher relative costs of transportation and in those with dis-
tinct geographic markets, the CFTC was particularly interested in
comments respecting the food and timber commodities. 30
Under the impetus of section 208, Toledo, Ohio and St. Louis,
Missouri were added as delivery points for corn futures. 3 1 Toledo,
granting the contract market an opportunity to be heard, may change or supplement such
rules and regulations of the contract market to achieve the above objectives: Provided,
That any order issued under this [subsection] shall not apply to contracts of sale for future
delivery in any months in which contracts are currently outstanding and open: And pro-
vided further, That no requirement for an additional delivery point or points shall be
promulgated following hearings until the contract market affected has had notice and op-
portunity to file exceptions to the proposed order determining the location and number of
such delivery point or points."
128. Id.
129. The notice sought comment regarding:
"1. The criteria which should be used to evaluate the desirability of a particular delivery
point or set of delivery points for the purposes of reducing potential market congestion,
manipulation, and abnormal movements of commodities in interstate commerce.
"2. The manner in which the locational price differentials between multiple delivery points
should be established to prevent market congestion, manipulation and abnormal movements
of commodities in interstate commerce.
"3. The use of multiple delivery points to circumvent the market congestion and manipula-
tion which may occur when a terminal market of declining commercial importance is em-
ployed as the sole dblivery location on a contract market, and the criteria for choosing addi-
tional or alternative delivery locations.
"4. Whether an increase in the number of delivery points for a contract, for the purposes of
reducing the potential for manipulation and congestion, will in some other manner reduce
the utility of the contract for price basing or hedging." See Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Delivery on Commodity Futures Contracts, Notice of Public Hearing, 41 Fed.
Reg. 3336, 3337 (1976).
130. Id.
131. See CFTC Release No. 470-79 (Mar. 5, 1979).
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which had been added as a delivery point for wheat futures in 1972
at the insistence of the CEA,' 32 was also made a soybean delivery
point.
13 3
In a speech on March 5, 1979 to members of the National
Grain and Feed Association, acting CFTC Chairman Seevers
listed the addition of delivery points as one of the major steps
taken to regulate commodity futures markets.1 ' Within a few days
of Seevers's speech, however, on March 15th, the CFTC was forced
to order suspension of trading of the March wheat futures contract
because manipulators were taking advantage of a natural
squeeze. 35
A particularly tight supply of soft wheat on the cash market,
entirely owing to natural causes, caused the CFTC to become
alarmed when a few speculators obtained over seventy-five percent
of the long side of the market. After the premium between Decem-
ber, 1979 and March, 1979 futures widened from eight to thirty
cents in less than a month, the CFTC warned the two traders hold-
ing the largest long positions. Ultimately, the December future liq-
uidated at an unusually high price relative to the cash price and to
other commodity futures.236
By March 1, the beginning of the delivery period of the March
futures, half a dozen floor traders held approximately fifteen per-
cent of the Chicago long contracts. The quantity of wheat neces-
sary to fulfill these contracts was almost six times greater than the
deliverable supply of wheat on hand in Chicago and Toledo. By the
middle of the month, four speculators had increased their interest
in the long position to more than ninety percent of the open inter-
est. At the same time, one of the largest speculators-also a floor
trader-had acquired almost one-half of the deliverable supply in
Chicago and Toledo. The combination resulted in the largest deliv-
ery month March-May premium in five years.
1 37
While these factors were combining to inflate Chicago futures
132. See Small Business Problems Involved in the Marketing of Grains and Other
Commodities, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Small Business Problems of the Perma-
nent Select Comm. on Small Business, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 325 (1973) (statement of Alex C.
Caldwell).
133. Id.
134. See CFTC Release No. 470-79 (Mar. 5, 1979).
135. Unnumbered CFTC Release (March 20, 1979) (Statement of Commissioner Read
P. Dunn, Jr.).
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id. at 2.
prices, wheat prices on the Kansas City and Minneapolis futures
markets remained stable. 8 Normally, the resulting large price dif-
ferentials would have caused wheat to move from these two mar-
kets to Chicago. However, the combination of a harsh winter, mak-
ing delivery by any means extremely difficult, and a shortage of
elevator capacity in Chicago and Toledo (because the elevators
were filled with soybeans and corn waiting to be moved out), pre-
vented the natural forces of supply and demand from operating.
With no indication that the speculators intended to reduce
their long positions, the CFTC directed the Chicago Board of
Trade to suspend trading of its March futures contracts as of
March 15.139 Although the order was premised on a finding that an
emergency situation existed, the order did not require any reduc-
tion in the positions held by the large speculators. Rather, the
emergency order only had the effect of closing the market to new
traders. Nonetheless, on Sunday, March 18, the United States Dis-
trict Court in the Northern District of Illinois specifically found
that no emergency existed and entered a preliminary injunction to
enjoin enforcement of the CFTC order.1 40 The Seventh Circuit de-
nied a request to stay the lower court's injunction, so trading re-
sumed unabated.M  The Commission's emergency action did, how-
ever, appear to have a sobering effect. After coming close to having
their speculation halted, the manipulators apparently believed it
was a good time to take their profits and began liquidating their
positions.
138. "As a result of these rather flat prices, the Chicago future increased appreciably
over both Kansas City and Minneapolis. Whereas on February 20, the Chicago March price
was about 48 cents over Minneapolis, the premium widened to over 70 cents by March 2. In
the same period, the Chicago future increased from 33 to 57 cents over the Kansas City
future." Id. at 2.
139. Under § 8a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act, if the Commission has reason to
believe that an "emergency" exists with respect to the trading of a commodity futures con-
tract, the Commission may direct the appropriate exchange to take whatever action is neces-
sary, in the Commission's view, to maintain or restore order. 7 U.S.C. § 8a(9) (1976).
140. See Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. CFTC, [1979] COMm. Fur. L. REP.
(CCH) 20,780 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The remarks of Judge Grady are revealing: "So I am not of
the view that I should be unduly deferential to the administrative determination here. I'm
not called upon to judge some arcane question of commodity trading. I am frank to say that
that would be beyond me. ...
"Is there a crisis over there across the street?
"I don't think I need any extraordinary expertise to be able to come to some reasonable
conclusion as to whether or not there is evidence from which the existence of such crises
could be concluded." Id. at 23, 185-86.
141. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. CFTC, 605 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1979).
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The policy of the 1974 Act is to prevent manipulation by ex-
panding the number of delivery points.14 2 The experience of the
1979 squeeze, however, suggests that this policy cannot effectively
deal with the Volkart dilemma. A multiplicity of deliverable grades
and points may make commodity futures contracts somewhat less
vulnerable to manipulation; nonetheless, markets with a multiplic-
ity of deliverable grades and delivery points remain vulnerable.
Even after Toledo was added as a delivery point, the Chicago
Board of Trade wheat contract continued to be manipulated. Its
continuing vulnerability was owing to the normal expectations of
the traders in commodity futures contracts not to have to make or
take delivery. Although commodity futures contracts retain the
form of contracts for sale of commodities with terms calling for
future delivery, in substance they are contracts for the purchase
and sale of rights.14
Most traders do not have the capacity or experience to make
or take delivery of a commodity. The only traders financially able
to do so are the large processors, who are also the most likely to
manipulate.14 ' For most traders, it is cheaper to pay whatever is
necessary to avoid delivery rather than to make or take delivery.
The argument that all parties to commodity futures contracts
should be prepared for delivery ignores the very purpose of a com-
modity futures market. The essence of commodity futures con-
tracts is the ability to take a position in a market without the bur-
den of ownership. 145 Delivery defeats this purpose. If parties must
be prepared to make or take delivery, they are dealing not with a
futures contract-a contract for legal rights in commodities-but
with the commodities themselves. For this reason, an unusually
high percentage of deliveries illustrates a distorted system of com-
modity futures trading,1 46 the normal percentage of deliveries be-
ing less than one percent.1 47 Because delivery is against the normal
142. This always has been the Department of Agriculture's main policy for preventing
manipulation. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, NEED FOR MULTIPLE DELIVERY POINTS IN
GRAIN FUTURES 10 (1947).
143. See Bakken, Adoption of Futures Trading To Live Cattle, in FrrTUmEs TRADING
IN LIVESTOCK 57 (1970).
144. See Note, Abuses in the Commodity Markets: The Need for Change in the Regu-
latory Structure, 63 GEo. L.J. 751, 757-60 (1975).
145. See Legal Status, supra note 47, at 156; Working, supra note 39, at 6, 28; Deliv-
ery Requirement, supra note 8, at 183 n.74.
146. See Legal Status, supra note 47 at 161 n.20.
147. See COMMODrrY EXCHANGES, supra note 8, at 210; Delivery Requirement, supra
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expectation of parties to commodity futures contracts, so long as
delivery is required, futures markets will be vulnerable to manipu-
lation regardless of how many delivery points there are for a par-
ticular contract.
Suggested Alternatives
The Cash Market Distortion Test
There have been various proposals for dealing with the
Volkart dilemma. One proposal, advocated by Thomas Hierony-
mus, is to tolerate any conduct as long as it does not distort cash
prices.148 Professor Hieronymus argues that "[m]arket regulation
by government and by exchanges is an administrative limitation on
market power. It limits the conflict that inheres in competitive
price formation."149 Recognizing the need for power to meet coun-
tervailing power, one must ask what "is the degree of conflict
which should be tolerated."1 50 The test formulated by Professor
Hieronymus of the allowable degree is simply: "[N]o cash price
and movement distortion, no punishable distortion."5 Under this
test, persons could insist on delivery as long as it did not cause a
distortion in cash price or a flow of a commodity to or from a deliv-
ery point.
Although Professor Hieronymus uses different nomenclature,
his approach is roughly the same as the Fifth Circuit's position in
Volkart. Whereas Professor Hieronymus would require traders to
contend with delivery as being necessary to the "integrity"' 2 of a
market, the Volkart court spoke of the "illegality" 153 of commodity
futures contracts if parties were not able to insist on making or
taking delivery. Both terms express the basic idea that traders
ought to be prepared to perform their contracts by delivery and
that to encourage them to do otherwise is wrong.
The view represented by Volkart and Professor Hierony-
mus-that persons who trade commodity futures contracts must
note 8, at 183 n.73.
148. See Hieronymus, Manipulation In Commodity Futures Trading: Toward A Defi-
nition, 6 HOFsTRA L. REV. 41, 53 (1977).
149. Id. at 52.
150. Id. at 53.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at n.107
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be prepared for delivery or suffer the consequences-is too con-
clusory. Implicit in this view is that a commodity futures contract
should be treated as a merchandising contract, which it is not and
cannot be.
The approach advocated by Professor Hieronymus would
merely make commodity futures contracts even more vulnerable to
manipulation than they are now; a person would be free to manip-
ulate as long as he or she did not distort cash prices. Professor
Hieronymus does not explain how one decides when there has been
a distortion in cash prices. Rather, he assumes that conduct that
distorts futures prices will at some point distort cash prices. How-
ever, in a market like the cash wheat market described in Car-
gill-a market in which the cash transactions are so few as to be
nominal-one cannot suppose that what happens to a futures mar-
ket will have any effect on cash prices. One of the primary difficul-
ties in proving manipulation of futures prices has always been the
lack of relationship between futures prices and cash prices. If a
relationship between cash and futures markets is lacking, which is
often the case, Professor Hieronymus's test amounts to no more
than greater freedom to manipulate futures markets.
The Good Faith Test
Another proposal for dealing with the Volkart dilemma is to
require that traders act in good faith in insisting on delivery.1" To
rebut the inference of manipulation, a trader would have to prove
that he or she acted in good faith in insisting on delivery. Good
faith would be determined by comparing the trader's conduct to
normal market conduct.1
55
The good faith rationale suffers from the same defect as does
the Volkart view: both viewpoints concede too much to perform-
ance by delivery of commodity futures contracts. The good faith
test would allow traders to insist on delivery if they act in good
faith according to commercial practices. It is unclear, however,
when it is not sound commercial practice to make a quick profit, as
Cargill did in the 1964 squeeze. If good faith is to be determined
by common commercial practice, a motive to make a profit would
excuse manipulation. This argument was implicit in Cargill's
154. See Delivery Requirement, supra note 8, at 184.
155. Id. at 185.
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defense.The good faith rationale is unsound, although less so than the
Volkart view, because it substitutes one fiction for another. The
substance of commodity futures contracts is not delivery but off-
set. Delivery was a legal fiction adopted to preserve the form of
legality against the threat posed by the general rule prohibiting
wagers. If delivery is a legal fiction, the good faith of a person in
insisting on delivery is also a fiction.
As with any fiction, the justification for the requirement of de-
livery must be to preserve the form of the law while the substance
of the law undergoes a change. Whether the fiction of delivery was
ever really necessary to preserve the form of legality of commodity
futures contracts is debatable inasmuch as commodity futures
trading originated in commercial practices and has always served a
legitimate business purpose.
Delivery would probably have ceased to be significant long ago
if there had been no need to believe in it. Delivery was, however,
necessary in part to justify commodity futures trading-to make it
something the general public could easily understand and accept.
The attacks periodically made against commodity futures trading
sustained the fiction of delivery. Against these attacks, commodity
futures trading could be demonstrated not to be gambling by re-
quiring that contracts be performed by delivery unless previously
offset. Offset was perceived as a refinement of merchandising con-
tracts and as merely a substitute for delivery rather than the pur-
pose of commodity futures contracts. If offset were a substitute for
delivery, delivery could not be eliminated.
The defense of commodity futures trading was as irrational as
were the attacks on it. Instead of simply recognizing that commod-
ity futures contracts should be treated as an exception to the in-
tent to deliver rule, the apologists for commodity futures trading
defended it on the ground that it involved real commodities that
had to be delivered. In trying to pass commodity futures trading
off as something it was not, however, the apologists aroused the
very suspicions that they intended to allay. The insignificant per-
centage of commodity futures contracts that were performed by
delivery merely confirmed popular suspicions about commodity fu-
tures trading. As a legal fiction, delivery failed to preserve the form
of legality. More importantly, it gave rise to all of the mischief re-
sulting from the rule that commodity futures contracts must be
performable by delivery.
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The Hindrance Test
A recent article by Edward McDermott sets forth a solution
similar to the good faith approach.15 Mr. McDermott begins his
argument by observing that the conventional approach fails to con-
sider all the variables that can affect the price of a commodity fu-
tures contract.157 He then notes that the deficiencies of the conven-
tional approach can be overcome by realizing that in the typical
squeeze the manipulator
threatens to demand delivery on what it has already bought or
owns. The purchase or threat to take delivery after ownership has
been secured serves no purpose except, of course, to hinder or
prevent performance and inflate prices to the benefit of the longer
trader on its resale. As such, it is not a bona fide transaction. 158
Manipulation, therefore, can be attacked under the common law
prohibition of "prevention" or "hindrance," which provided that a
trader would be guilty of manipulation by acquiring enough deliv-
erable supply to prevent the performance of contracts requiring
delivery.159 Hindrance could also be proved by other acts, such as
monopolizing means of delivery or spreading false rumors, which
hindered or prevented delivery.
Mr. McDermott develops the hindrance rationale to avoid the
problem created by Volkart. Hindrance, as he has characterized it,
would be nothing more than the common law crime of forestalling,
that is, of preventing goods from reaching the market.160 This defi-
nition is evident from his reference to hindrance by spreading false
156. See McDermott, Defining Manipulation In Commodity Futures Trading: The
Futures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 202 (1979).
157. With regard to the leading manipulation cases, Mr. McDermott notes: "The
analysis was indifferent to other market factors such as the composition or liquidity of the
futures market at the relevant times, the number of orders placed and yet not filled, the
trading pattern, and the nature and positions on the short side of the futures market." Id. at
209.
158. Id. at 214.
159. McDermott, Defining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Fu-
tures "Squeeze," 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 202, 220 n.89 (1979).
160. See Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YALE
L.J. 905, 907 (1926). "The owners of the market or fairs usually exacted tolls on sales and a
charge known as stallage for space for stalls in which to display goods. If they had a monop-
oly in specified territory their charges were often excessive. The obstruction of those coming
to market so as to deprive the market owner of his stallage and the people of an unrestricted
market in which to buy, was called forestalling and was unlawful, both at common law and
under the statutes. At first the term seems to have been applied merely to physical obstruc-
tions to the movement of goods to the market, but the term quickly acquired a much larger
significance." Id.
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rumors, which was, at common law, merely a means of forestalling.
It is difficult, however, to see how an understanding of the law of
manipulation is advanced by labeling a trader's conduct "hin-
drance" rather than "forestalling," or even "manipulation." Mr.
McDermott's hindrance test is tautological. Furthermore, the anal-
ogy between manipulation and hindrance breaks down in the situa-
tion in which a trader merely insists on delivery without having a
position in the cash market. In this situation, Mr. McDermott
must say that merely taking delivery is 'a hindrance. This goes be-
yond common law hindrance, which involved only actively buying
up commodities that were to be delivered on a contract.161 Al-
though Mr. McDermott's criticism of the price distortion approach
is well founded, the hindrance rationale fails to deal with the ques-
tion of whether a trader can be guilty of manipulation by doing no
more than taking delivery.
Eliminating Delivery
Various commentators have suggested that delivery probably
could be eliminated from futures trading once the use of a market
for hedging has become established.162 Professor Bakken has gone
a step further in describing the requirement of delivery as "a ves-
tigial concept of an age-old custom that may be relegated to obliv-
ion .. .163
It is possible that delivery could be effectively eliminated by
procedures allowing for cash settlement in its stead.'" On the Liv-
erpool wheat futures market, for example, there is no rule or law
requiring that a contract be performed by delivery rather than by
a cash settlement. Procedures provide for an impartial determina-
tion of settlement price and any penalties to be paid in the case of
default.16 5 As a result of these procedures, no manipulation of the
Liverpool wheat market has ever been detected, even though it ap-
pears particularly susceptible to manipulation because of the ir-
161. See, e.g., Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N.Y. 96, 97 N.E. 472 (1912); RESTATEMENT
OF CoNTRACrs § 295 (1932).
162. See, e.g., Working, supra note 39, at 21.
163. Bakken, Adoption of Futures Trading to Live Cattle, in FUTURES TRADING IN
LIVESTOCK 57, 66 (1970).
164. See COMMODITY EXCHANGES, supra note 8, at 84; H. IRWIN, EVOLUTION OF Fu-
TURES TRADING 49 (1954).
165. See H. IRWIN, EVOLUTION OF FUTURES TRADING 50 (1954).
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ited storage facilities available.'
The conventional argument against dispensing with delivery
terms was that delivery is an essential connection between the
"real" world of cash commodities and the world of commodity fu-
tures.16 7 This connection was deemed necessary because the price
of commodity futures contracts and the cash price of a commodity
should and normally do converge at the time of delivery. Delivery
is assumed to be the cause of this convergence. If the price of fu-
tures is too high, traders will sell futures and buy cash commodi-
ties, thus bringing futures and cash prices together. If the cash
price is too high, traders will sell cash commodities and buy fu-
tures, thus bringing the cash price and the futures price together.
The fallacy in this argument is the underlying assumption that
the physical act of delivery is the reason for the convergence of the
prices. The minute percentage of contracts performed by delivery
demonstrates this fallacy. The convergence of cash and futures
must be a result of what people believe rather than what they do.
The two prices converge because of what parties to commodity fu-
tures contracts must believe-that the value of intangible contract
rights of a commodity futures contract is to be measured by the
commodity's cash price. Parties to commodity futures contracts
must believe this as there is no other rational standard by which to
measure the value of the intangible contract rights.,, 8 That traders
decide on trading strategies by making such a comparison before
actual delivery proves that physical delivery is unnecessary.
Presuming Manipulation
If the only reason for delivery terms in commodity futures
contracts were the conventional argument that it provides a nexus
between the cash price of a commodity and the price of a commod-
ity future, one could easily suggest that delivery be eliminated al-
together. What has perpetuated the belief that commodity futures
contracts must be performed by delivery, however, is far more
166. See Working, supra note 39, at 22.
167. See Futrell, Do Live Futures Differ from Other Existing Futures Contracts?, in
FUTURES TRAING IN LIVESTOCK 72 (H. Bakken ed. 1970); Comment, Manipulation of Com-
modity Futures Prices-The Great Western Case, 21 U. CH. L. REv. 94, 95 (1953).
168. Professor Commons classifies commodity futures contracts, along with other doc-
uments of intangible and incorporeal property, as "commodity tickets," which change in
value with the value of the thing to which the ticket lays claim. See J. COMMONS, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 257 (1957).
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compelling than the conventional argument for it. An instinct to
protect business, coupled with a degree of self-interest, has perpet-
uated the belief in delivery. The first commodity futures markets
developed spontaneously out of cash markets. Little thought was
given to why commodity futures markets worked; it was enough to
know that they did. Without knowing what effect eliminating de-
livery terms would have, the conservative view has always been to
oppose any change. Delivery terms also contain an element of pro-
vincialism: Chicago wheat is Chicago wheat, not Toledo wheat. A
contract that for decades had called for Chicago delivery may have
delivery outside of Chicago. Some of the most influential patrons
of commodity futures markets, the large hedgers and warehouses
of Chicago wheat, were located in Chicago.and were understanda-
bly interested in having delivery where it could be the most advan-
tageous to them. They were far more influential than the farmers,
who were not members of the exchanges.
Probably the most important reason for commodity futures
contracts being performable by delivery has been the interest of
the exchanges in maintaining a large volume of trading. To sustain
volume, commodity futures markets must have a certain instabil-
ity. If instability is eliminated so that the price in the future be-
comes certain, or relatively certain, the reason for commodity fu-
tures markets ceases. The raison d'9tre of commodity markets is
uncertainty about the future.
Uncertainty is caused by variability in supply and demand, a
variability that is augmented by delivery terms. Commodity fu-
tures contracts with narrowly specified deliverable grades or few
delivery points are unstable because local conditions can readily
affect deliverable supply. For the same reason, unfortunately, it is
easier to control or exploit a market in which there is not a broad
diversity of deliverable supply. The preeminent interest of com-
modity exchange members in sustaining a large volume of trading
minimizes their interest in making commodity futures invulnerable
to manipulation at the expense of that volume. This self-interest
probably explains why exchanges have generally resisted proposals
to prevent manipulation.6 9 During the late 1800's and early 1900's,
169. See T. HIERONYmUS, EcoNoMIcs oi FUTuRES TRADING 82-87 (1971); Legal Status,
supra note 47, at 162 n.21; Lurie, Commodity Exchanges As Self-Regulating Organizations
In The Late 19th Century: Some Perimeters In The History of American Administrative
Law, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 1107, 1132 (1975).
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for example, the membership in the Chicago Board of Trade peri-
odically defeated attempts to liberalize delivery terms.170
The belief that delivery is necessary to sustain a volume of
trading sufficient to keep commodity futures markets operating
successfully also explains government regulators' unwillingness to
use their power to create a multiplicity of delivery points and
grades. Government regulators sympathizbd with the interest of
exchanges in attracting the volume adequate to sustain trading.
The interest of exchange members in having sufficient volume
to sustain commodity futures markets is a legitimate interest.
Trading volume is essential to liquidity. Vulnerability to manipula-
tion can be seen as the quid pro quo for trading volume. Price
movement is the cynosure that attracts trading.
The interest in trading volume and its relation to delivery
terms would have been more widely understood if it had been de-
bated openly. It would have been tantamount to heresy, however,
for those who extol the use of commodity futures as a way of en-
suring against risk to advocate instability at the same time. There-
fore, the exchanges' interest in somewhat unstable markets has
been promoted by other arguments, such as the rule against wagers
or that delivery is necessary to connect cash and futures.
Although the conventional arguments raised in favor of deliv-
ery may not be persuasive, the requirement of delivery need not be
dispensed with. Because commodity futures contracts are intangi-
ble contract rights, contractors must believe those rights have
value. If this belief depends on the fiction or myth that commodity
futures contracts must be linked to the "real" world by being per-
formable by delivery, one hesitates to abolish the delivery
requirement.
The basic problem in the law dealing with the manipulation of
commodity futures markets has been the confusion caused by the
general rule against wagers. That commodity futures contracts
must be performable by delivery has prevented administrators and
courts from finding manipulation when traders simply insisted on
delivery. For a trader to insist on delivery is generally the clearest
evidence, and often the only evidence, of manipulation. The inabil-
ity to rely upon this evidence has necessitated the task of proving
manipulation through price distortion. Once the requirement of
delivery is recognized for what it is-a lawyer's fiction that has be-
170. See T. HIERONYMUS, ECONOMICS OF FuTuREs TRADING 86 (1971).
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come an economist's myth-the way is clear. The solution to the
Volkart dilemma is simply to recognize a trader's insistance on de-
livery for what it is-manipulation.
Traders who do not offset within a specified time before deliv-
ery should be presumed to be guilty of manipulation. This is not a
novel proposal. A 1926 report by the Federal Trade Commission
recognized that delivery was so unusual that it was often prima
facie evidence of a manipulative intent for a trader to carry long
positions late into a delivery month.171 If a trader were presumed
to intend to manipulate by holding a position for delivery rather
than offsetting, the burden would shift from the CFTC's having to
disprove innocence to traders' having to prove their innocence.
This burden would not be nearly as onerous as the present one'
faced by the regulators. Traders have ready access to the evidence
concerning why they have insisted on delivery. They can easily and
quickly prove their innocence, and their proof would certainly be
easier and quicker than the CFTC's burden of proving the elusive
absence of justification. To require traders to do so conforms with
a basic precept of evidence that, as between two parties, the party
to whom the evidence is readily available should bear the burden
of coming forward with it. As between the CFTC and the trader,
only the trader can come forth with evidence that holding a posi-
tion and demanding delivery was for a purpose other than
manipulation.
Conclusion
The efforts by the CFTC to prevent the manipulation of com-
modity futures markets will continue to be thwarted by the deliv-
ery requirement, which is an historical hangover from the law of
wagers. It is ironic that the intent-to-deliver rule-a rule originally
embraced by the courts as a means of preventing manipula-
tion-should now obstruct the efforts of government to prevent the
manipulation of commodity futures markets. Once recognized,
however, there is no reason why the "felt necessities 172 of the past
171. See 7 F.T.C. Report 219 (1926).
172. See 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). It is ironic that the person who
wrote "[i]n the course of centuries the ... necessity disappears, but the rule remains," id.
at 5, would preserve the influence of the forgotten past by resorting to the legal fiction that
offset is the equivalent of delivery. See Chicago Board of Trade v. Christie Grain and Stock
Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
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should frustrate the prevention of the manipulation of commodity
futures markets.
This Article has suggested as a solution to the Volkart di-
lemma that persons who insist upon delivery should be presumed
to intend to manipulate. This is consistent with the substance of
commodity futures contracts and does not entail a drastic change
in the law or the customs and usages of commodity futures trading.

